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II. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal on review from the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals 
affirmed the district court's order, on intermediate appeal, reversing the magistrate court's 
suppression of evidence following a traffic stop. The substantive facts and a description of 
the course of proceedings below are contained in Mr. Neal's opening brief before the Court 
of Appeals. Appellant Court of Appeals Opening Br., pp. 1-2. His opening and reply briefs, 
as well as all other briefs, are incorporated herein by this reference, unless they are 
inconsistent with this brief. 
In short, after a suppression hearing, the magistrate court found that Mr. Neal had 
driven his Chevrolet Silver ado on, but not across, a fog line, and later did the same on 
another line. The law enforcement officer never witnessed Mr. Neal speed, fail to signal, or 
commit any traffic infraction other than the purported infraction at issue in this case. Tr. p. 
35, 11. 2-9. The magistrate granted Mr. Neal's motion to suppress, reasoning that "there 
was no evidence this occurred in Boise," which eliminated the possibility that the Boise City 
Code could apply. R. 102. The magistrate also described Mr. Neal's driving as a "rather 
innocuous driving pattern," after holding that he was "not persuaded that driving on, but 
not across, a dividing line is a violation of Idaho Code sec. 49-637." R. 103. 
It is noted thatthe state appears critical of the structure of Mr. Neal's memorandum 
in support of his petition for review, stating that the memorandum "does not contain a 
statement of the issues on review[,] does not identify any error committed by the district 
court[,] and has presented no new argument in relation to the propriety of the district 
court's decision[.]" State's Br., p. 2. The purpose of the petition for review, as is apparent 
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from I.A.R. 118, is to identify problems or novelty within the Court of Appeals' 
I.AR. 118(b)(1)-(5). Thus, the memorandum in support of the petition for review contains 
analysis only of the Court of Appeals' decision. 
Because a memorandum in support of the petition focuses on the Court of Appeals' 
decision, in deciding whether to grant the petition, this Court reviews the reasoning of the 
Court of Appeals. But after the petition is granted, and it is time to write an opinion, this 
Court directly reviews the district court's decision, independently of the Court of Appeals' 
decision. State v. Clinton, 155 Idaho 271, 273 n. 1 (2013) ("Even when we grant review in a 
case that was initially decided by the Court of Appeals, we do not reverse its decision when 
we disagree with it, because we hear the case anew and do not review the decision of the 
Court of Appeals.") (emphasis added). 
The Idaho Supreme Court sets a briefing schedule after a petition is granted. I.A.R. 
118(a) ("If a petition for review is granted, the Supreme Court will include in its order the 
sequence for the filing of briefs by the parties before oral argument.") It therefore would 
appear that a brief in support of a petition involves a different analysis from a brief that 
follows this Court's granting of the petition. The instant brief is Mr. Neal's first brief, at the 
Idaho Supreme Court level, to analyze the district court. With this procedural 
understanding in mind, Mr. Neal submits the following analysis of the district court's 
decision. 
III. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The issues on appeal are contained on page 2 of Mr. Neal's opening brief before the 




A Standard of Review and Basic Principles 
"The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. This Court accepts 
the trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely 
reviews the application of constitutional principles to the facts found." State v. Watts, 142 
Idaho 230, 232 (2005). Questions of statutory interpretation are "question[s] oflaw over 
which we exercise free review." State v. Yager, 139 Idaho 680, 689 (2004). 
When reviewing an appeal from the district court acting in its appellate capacity, 
this Court directly reviews the district court. Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 6 70 (2008). 
A seizure without a warrant is unreasonable per se, "subject only to a few 
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions," Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 34 7, 
357 (196 7), such as an officer's reasonable suspicion of a driver's violation of a traffic law. 
Deen v. State, 131 Idaho 435, 435 (1992) ("the Fourth Amendment requires that a traffic 
stop must be supported by reasonable and articulable suspicion that the vehicle is being 
driven contrary to the traffic laws .... ") (quotations omitted). 
Evidence obtained as a result of an illegal seizure is fruit of the poisonous tree and 
must be suppressed. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 
4 71, 487 (1963). 
B. Summary of the Argument 
Are Idaho's streets football fields or baseball fields? That is the first question in this 
appeal. In baseball, foul lines are good; in football, a player is out of bounds when he 
touches the line. Idaho's traffic statutes, contained in Title 49, are clear that a vehicle 
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remains in its lane when it touches a line. In fact, they specifically state that a fog line is 
intended "for vehicular travel." 
Regardless, even if a vehicle momentarily leaves its lane by touching the line, the 
statute only requires vehicles to maintain their lanes "as nearly as practicable." Thus, if 
Idaho's streets are football fields, the Court must determine the meaning of "as nearly as 
practicable." This language serves as an acknowledgment of basic human limitations, and 
therefore the language permits minor lane breaches. Especially when the statute is read in 
conjunction with other Title 49 statutes, it is clear that minor lane breaches do not fall 
within the scope of the statute. 
The next issue is whether the Boise City Code can apply to this case, a fact that the 
state bore the burden of proving. The heart of that question is whether state met its 
burden of establishing that the relevant driving occurred within Boise City limits. This 
issue was sufficiently briefed before the Court of Appeals. 
The final issue involves mistake of law. At the magistrate level, the state bore the 
burden of establishing an exception to the warrant requirement. The state never 
attempted to meet its burden by arguing that a reasonable mistake of law could justify a 
law enforcement officer's seizure of a driver. On intermediate appeal before the district 
court, after the state had lost at the magistrate level, the state again failed to raise the issue. 
Nevertheless, the district court raised it on its own. Raising the issue sua sponte denied Mr. 
Neal his right to due process of law, because he did not receive the opportunity to present 
any argument in response. 
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In th~.s case, the motion to suppress was brought pursuant to the Constitution 
and the Idaho Constitution. The Idaho Constitution views law enforcement's mistakes of 
law very differently from the U.S. Constitution, but that fact only recently became apparent 
after the U.S. Supreme Court issued a landmark decision on the mistake oflaw issue. Heien 
v. North Carolina,_ S.Ct. _ (2014). Therefore, this Court should 
1. refuse to consider the mistake of law issue, as it was forfeited by the state's 
failure to raise it, 
2. if the Court considers the U.S. Constitutional argument, hold that the mistake 
of law was unreasonable, 
3. remand the case to the district court for remand to the magistrate to consider 
the Idaho Constitutional arguments relating to mistake oflaw, or 
4. if the Court considers the Idaho Constitutional argument, hold that the Idaho 
Constitution would not allow the mistake at issue to qualify as a basis to seize 
Mr. Neal. 
C. Touching the Line does not Violate Idaho Code§ 49-637 
1. Idaho Law is Unambiguous that a Line is a Part of a Lane 
The statute here at issue provides: 
Whenever any highway has been divided into two (2) or more clearly 
marked lanes for traffic the following, in addition to all else, shall apply: 
(1) A vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a 
single lane and shall not be moved from that lane until the driver has first 
ascertained that the movement can be made with safety. ( emphasis added). 
If a line is a part of a lane, then a vehicle obviously is driven "within a single lane" 
when it touches the line. The definitions contained in Title 49 require that conclusion. 
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A "roadway" is "that portion of a highway improved, de~igned or ordinarily used for 
vehicular travel, exclusive of sidewalks, shoulders, berms and rights-of-way." LC.§ 49-119 
(emphasis added). A "highway" is essentially defined as all roadways, plus all of the 
exclusions from roadways, to wit, sidewalks, shoulders, berms and rights-of-way not 
intended for motorized traffic. LC.§ 49-109(5). A sidewalk "means that portion of a street1 
between the curb lines, or the lateral lines Q[ a roadway, and the adjacent property lines 
intended for use by pedestrians." LC.§ 49-120(12) (emphasis added). tlLateral" means tlof 
or relating to the side." www.merriam-webster.com (search: "lateral"). 
Therefore, the "lateral lines of a roadway" are the lines on the side: the fog lines; 
The fog lines therefore are tlof a roadway." A roadway is designed for vehicular travel. Fog 
lines therefore are designed for vehicular travel. Because one may travel on the lines, one 
remains within his lane by traveling on the line. Section 49-637 requires drivers to 
maintain their lanes, and the above statutes allow drivers to drive on the lines of the lanes.2 
It follows that one maintains his lane by driving on the line. The briefing in this case has 
become somewhat voluminous, but the case may be decided entirely on these simple, 
straightforward statutory definitions. 
The state argues that the issue is resolved with the definition of "traffic lane" or 
"lane of travel." Respondent Br. on Review, p. 6. Mr. Neal agrees. That definition states 
that a lane of travel "means that portion of the roadway for movement of a single line of 
vehicles." (emphasis added). As explained above, the fog lines are used for vehicular travel, 
1 "Street" and "highway" are synonymous under Title 49. LC.§ 49-109(5) ("The term 'street:' is 
interchangeable with highway."). 
2 At a minimum, they allow driving on fog lines. 
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i.e., "movement." The state's citation to th2 definition of "lane of travel" fully supports Mr. 
Neal's position that the fog line forms a part of the lane. The state has made no effort, at 
any point, to explain how a fog line may be "intended for vehicular travel," and at the same 
time prohibited from vehicular travel. 
The only tangential point offered by the state is its argument that, if we allow 
vehicles to travel on a line, then two vehicles can travel on the same line. Respondent Br. on 
Review, p. 11. In essence, the state suggests that, under Mr. Neal's interpretation of the 
statutes, multiple vehicles might ride on the same fog line, when "traffic lanes" are intended 
for a "single" line of vehicles. Respondent Br. on Review, p. 11. Here is the problem with 
the state's argument: fog lines are atthe extreme right side of the road. There is no danger 
that two vehicles will drive on the same line when the line is a fog line. Whether a non-fog 
line forms a part of a lane is a question for another day. In this case, we know that a fog line 
is a part of a lane, and because vehicles cannot travel on the right side of a fog line, there is 
no danger that two vehicles will be driving on the line/lane. 
Here is the other problem with the state's argument: it only works from the Ivory 
Tower. If we allow ourselves to descend from the Ivory Tower, and to step into a vehicle 
before we drive down the road, we realize that Mr. Neal's position is perfectly consistent 
with the definition of "lane of travel," including the portion that references a "single line of 
vehicles." From the Ivory Tower, the state theorizes that, if two vehicles can share a line, 
then there are two vehicles in a lane, and that fact is inconsistent with the implied 
requirement that a lane be for a single line of vehicles. But as we know from experience, 
and by living in the real world-among real cars and trucks-two vehicles cannot share the 
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same line while traveling down the mad. Idaho's statutes unambiguously allow a vehicle to . 
travel on a fog line. 
2. If an Ambiguity Exists, it should be Resolved in Mr. Neal's Favor 
Neither the district court nor the state has suggested that LC.§ 49-637(1) is 
ambiguous. If this Court deems the statute ambiguous, however, Mr. Neal submits that he 
should prevail based on his analysis contained in his memorandum in support of his 
petition for review. Mr. Neal has argued that LC.§ 49-1401(1) clearly indicates that a line 
is in a lane. The reason is simple: that's what it says ("when there is a line in his lane 
indicating a sight.distance restnction"). 
In addition to the reckless driving statute, Idaho Code§ 49-630(3) also suggests that 
the other lines are a part of the lane. It states that no "vehicle shall be driven to the left of 
the center line upon any highway having four ( 4) or more lanes for moving traffic and 
providing for two-way movement of traffic .... " If one left his lane by traveling on the line, 
it is unlikely that the statute would prohibit only traveling all the way to the left of the line. 
This type of argument, according to the state, "do[es] not withstand even the 
slightest scrutiny because [it] rest[s] on the patently incorrect premise that the reckless 
driving statute actually defines the term 'lane."' Respondent Br. on Review, p. 10. This 
criticism reflects a misunderstanding, on the state's part, of the principle of statutory 
construction described in Mr. Neal's memorandum in support of his petition for review. 
Specifically, Mr. Neal has relied on the doctrine of in pari materia, which has been explained 
as follows: 
Statutes are in pari materia when they relate to the same subject (Black on 
Interpretation of Laws, 2d ed., p. 3 31, sec. 104.) Such statutes are taken 
together and construed as one system, and the object is to carry into effect 
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the intention. It is to be inferred that a code of statutes relating to one subject 
was governed by one spirit and policy, and was intended to be consistent 
and harmonious in its several parts and provisions. For the purpose of 
learning the intention, all statutes relating to the same subject are to be 
compared, and so far as still in force brought into harmony by interpretation. 
must be read together, harmoniously, as one system. Meyers v. City of Idaho 
Falls, 52 Idaho 81, 90 (1932)(emphasis added). 
The doctrine of in pari materia does not apply only when one statute's definition is 
applied to another statute. The doctrine instead applies when a statute is ambiguous, and 
the ambiguity is resolved by bringing the statute into harmony with another statute 
involving the same subject-matter. The state never even mentioned the in pari materia 
doctrine in its responsive briefing, but still claimed that Mr. Neal's argument does not 
"withstand even the slightest scrutiny." Mr. Neal's argument did not receive the slightest 
scrutiny from the state. The state's contention-that another statute may be helpful only if 
it goes as far as to define the term in question-is simply inconsistent with the doctrine of 
in pari materia. 
After evaluating the actual legislative acts within Title 49, the legislature's intent 
becomes clear and all ambiguity is resolved: a line is a part of a lane. 
3. "As Nearly as Practicable" 
If this Court determines that a line is not a part of a lane, the next question is whether 
Mr. Neal drove "as nearly as practicable" within his lane. Again, the statute here at issue 
provides: 
Whenever any highway has been divided into two (2) or more clearly 
marked lanes for traffic the following, in addition to all else, shall apply: 
(1) A vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a 
single lane and shall not be moved from that lane until the driver has first 
ascertained that the movement can be made with safety. (emphasis added). 
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Many courts have analyzed language, but perhaps the most thorough analysis 
has come from the Kansas Supreme Court in a case on review from the Kansas Court of 
Appeals. State v. Marx, 215 P.3d 601 (2009). In Marx, a motorhome was seized by an 
officer, after the motorhome "crossed the fog line, which is a solid white line, overcorrected 
and crossed ... the 'dotted line' ... between the two northbound lanes .... " Id. at 604. The 
Kansas Supreme Court, in Marx, resolved the Kansas Court of Appeals' then-recent 
inconsistent decisions: State v. Ross, 149 P.3d 876 (2007) and State v. Marx, 171 P.3d 276 
. (2007). Id. at 608 ("Our first task is to resolve the conflict between Ross and Marx as to the 
conduct proscribed by" the Kansas statute3). 
The Marx Kansas Supreme Court decision is especially helpful in this case, because 
the conflicting Kansas Court of Appeals decisions represent the essential positions that the 
state and Mr. Neal have taken as this case has proceeded up Idaho's appellate ladder. 
Essentially, Ross represents Mr. Neal's earlier interpretations, and the lower Marx decision 
(on review to the Kansas Supreme Court) represents the state's position. In the end, the 
Kansas Supreme Court considered those arguments, interpreted the statute differently 
from the lower courts, and reached an eminently reasoned conclusion. Mr. Neal essentially 
adopts the analysis of the Marx decision. As explained below, he does so even though it 
requires concessions on his part. 
3 That statute provided: "Whenever any roadway has been divided into two (2) or more clearly 
marked lanes for traffic, the following rules in addition to all others consistent herewith shall 
apply ... (a) A vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane and 
shall not be moved from such lane until the driver has first ascertained that such movement can 
be made with safety." K.S.A. 8-1522. 
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According to M0.r;( "(t]he opening paragraph [ of the statute] establishes a conditi0n 
precedent to the applicability of the rules which follow." Id. at 667. In this case, there 
existed two or more clearly marked lanes for traffic and therefore the condition precedent 
is satisfied. 
The next paragraph "directs drivers to perform a positive act ( drive entirely within 
one's lane) and to refrain from doing a prohibited act (moving from one's travel lane 
without first ascertaining it is safe to do so)." Id. at 66 7-68. The difference between the 
lower courts' competing analyes was "in their respective characterization of the 
relationship betweE'n the directives, i.e., whether they are alternative means of violating 
[the statute] or are both necessary elements of but one prohibited act." Ross, as well as Mr. 
Neal, treated "the two directives as elements of a single offense, so that to obtain a 
conviction ... , the State must prove both that the driver failed to stay within the lane 
markers and that the movement outside the lane was made without first ascertaining that 
it was safe to move." Id. at 668. 
Certainly, this position finds support in the language of the statute. "Support for 
Ross' position can be found in the plain language of' the statute. Id. "The word 'and' sits 
between the two directives; 'and' is ordinarily used in a statute as a conjunctive. To 
paraphrase the legislature, a person is to drive within a single lane and is not to move 
without ascertaining it is safe to do so." Id. The Marx court acknowledged that this 
interpretation also finds substantial support across the country. Id. at 268-69 (citing 
cases). 
11 
Des;iit:e the vast extrajurisdictional support for his own previous 0 p0sition, Mr. Neal 
agrees with the state that the statute contains two, not one, proscriptions. See, Respondent 
Br. on Review, p. 7 ("The plain language of LC.§ 49-637(1) imposes two requirements on 
motorists ... : (1) that [they] drive their vehicles as nearly as practicable within a single 
lane, and (2) that motorists not move their vehicles from the single lane in which they are 
traveling without first ascertaining that the movement can be made with safety.") The 
lower appellate court in Marx essentially interpreted the statute in this manner. Id. at 669. 
In agreeing with that aspect of the lower court's decision, the Kansas Supreme Court 
reasoned that, despite the use of the word "and," "this is one of those rare occasions when 
the context of the entire statute counsels against placing an inordinate emphasis on the 
chosen connecting word." Id. at 671. The "statute address[es] two different operational 
aspects of traveling on a laned roadway: driving down the road in a selected lane of travel 
and changing lanes of travel. When a driver is engaged in one operation, he or she is not 
engaged in the other." Id. The first directive (the "single lane rule") "is a continuous rule; it 
applies to the entire trip on a laned roadway and ceases to apply only when the vehicle 
exits the roadway." Id. at 672. 
The "statute provides for a temporary suspension of the single lane rule in two 
instances: when it is impracticable to stay within the lane markers and when the driver is 
moving from the lane of travel." Id. The single lane rule "obviously" is required to "yield to 
a lane change or that maneuver could not be accomplished. Nevertheless, once the lane 
change is effected and the vehicle is traveling in a new lane, the single lane rule suspension 
must end." Id. The key reason for allowing a suspension of the rule in that case is that it 
12 
"would render the single lane a nullity to permit a driver to straddle a lane marker 
the remainder of the trip just because he or she had complied with the rule governing 
movement from the first chosen lane of travel." Id. Again, this reasoning is persuasive, 
despite Mr. Neal's prior arguments to the contrary. 
While Mr. Neal has joined Marx's and the state's analysis in the above respect, Mr. 
Neal and Marx disagree with the state regarding the other instance in which the single lane 
rule is suspended: the "as nearly as practicable" instance. As explained, LC.§ 49-637(1) 
states only that "[a] vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a single 
lane .. " ( emphasis added). Marx rejected the Kansas Court of Appeals' conclusion that "the 
district court erred 'as a matter of law' in finding an absence of reasonable suspicion. We 
do not believe such a rigid rule of law is consistent with the analysis required to determine 
reasonable suspicion." Id. at 674 (citation omitted). The statute "is not a strict liability 
offense." Rather, the "express language employed-'as nearly as practicable'---contradicts 
the notion that any and all intrusions upon the marker lines of the chosen travel lane 
constitute a violation." Id. For example, weather conditions and the like may render it 
impracticable to maintain a lane. Id. 
But the exception cannot simply end there. The Marx court continued: "However, 
the statute even dilutes the practicability standard. It does not say 'when practicable' a 
vehicle will be driven entirely within a single lane." Id. Rather, it "only requires compliance 
with the single lane rule as nearly as practicable, i.e., compliance that is close to that which 
is feasible. That statutory language tells us that a violation of [the statute] requires more 
than an incidental and minimal lane breach." Id. (bold emphasis added, italics supplied). 
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Therefore, the court held that "contrary to the Marx [Court of Appeals'] that the 
deputy's testimony that he observed the motor home cross the fog line, overcorrect, and 
cross the centerline ended the reasonable suspicion inquiry in the State's favor, a detaining 
officer must articulate something more than an observation of one instance of a 
momentary lane breach." Id. (emphasis added). 
Throughout this case, Mr. Neal has contended that the "as nearly as practicable" 
language is intended to afford drivers some reasonable latitude when attempting to 
maintain their lanes. In other words, minor lane breaches may be permitted, and 
perfection is not required. In this case, and in the recent case of State-v. Morris (2015 
Opinion No. 9) (Feb. 18, 2015), the Idaho Court of Appeals essentially assigned legislative 
significance to the dictionary's definition of "practicable."4 The state has adopted this 
reasoning. Respondent's Br. on Review, p. 12 (''the Court of Appeals correctly interpreted 
LC.§ 49-637(1) as requiring motorists to drive the vehicles between painted lane 
markings, not on them, absent circumstances that would make it impracticable to stay 
between the lines,") 
To be sure, dictionaries are useful tools that may be consulted to interpret the 
language of a statute. However, the authors of Black's Law Dictionary, or any other 
dictionary, are not members of the Idaho Legislature. The purpose of statutory 
interpretation is to ascertain the legislature's intent. Other courts have acknowledged that 
this objective is not always furthered by consulting a dictionary. State v. Harvey, 710 
N.W.2d 482 (Wis. Ct. App. 2006) ("While the law commonly looks to a standard dictionary 
4 "Practicable" was defined as "feasible in the circumstances" and "able to be done or put into 
practice successfully." 
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.. ,. for guidance in defining a word in easily understood terms; source cannot always be 
relied upon ... to supply or explain legal nuances. Our focus must remain on ascertaining 
the legal definition consistent with the legislative intent") (bold emphasis added, italics 
supplied). 
Idaho also has rejected definitions when a statute's context suggests that it is 
appropriate to do so. In State v. Skunkcap, this Court rejected a general definition of 
"maliciously" because the statute's context demanded a different interpretation. 157 Idaho 
221, _, 335 P.3d 561, 569 (2014) ("We agree with Defendant that the statutory definition 
of 'maliciously' in section 18-101 ( 4) does not apply as written to the crime of malicious 
injury to property as defined in Idaho Code section 18-7001(1). [The malicious injury 
statute] obviously requires a different state cif mind.") 
Similarly, in State v. Knott, this Court applied a Title 49 definition to a Title 18 
definition, despite the fact that "statutory definitions are generally limited to the same title, 
chapter or act"; it did so because the "context and approved usage of the relevant phrase 
indicates that its meaning is the same in both titles." 132 Idaho 476,477 (1999) 
(quotations omitted) (interpreting "private property open to the public," applying LC.§ 
73-113, and explaining that identical interpretation is appropriate in part because 
"identical terms are used in the statutes"). In reaching its conclusion, the Knott Court relied 
on LC.§ 73-113(3), which provides that "Words and phrases are construed according to the 
context and the approved usage of the language, but technical words and phrases, and such 
others as have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in law ... are to be construed 
according to such peculiar and appropriate meaning . .. " ( emphasis added). 
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This Court also has rejected a dictior:.ary d<:finition that would have created an 
ambiguity had the alternative definition been accepted. State v. Schulz, 151 Idaho 863 
(2011). In Schulz, this Court interpreted the meaning of "cohabiting." Id. The question was 
whether "cohabiting" required an intimate relationship, or whether it merely meant "living 
together." Id. at 867. This Court concluded that the statute was unambiguous whether it 
required an intimate relationship. Id. "A statute is ambiguous where the language is 
capable of more than one reasonable construction." Verska v. St. Alphonsus Regional Med. 
Ctr., 151 Idaho 889,896 (2011). The Court cited a "cohabit" definition that directly 
supported the state's position that "the term 'cohabit' [is defined to mean] 'to live together 
or in company[.]'" Schulz, 151 Idaho at 86 7. Although that dictionary definition may have 
created an ambiguity, it was rejected because the context of the statute required 
application of a different, specific dictionary and common law definition. Id. 
In this case, the dictionary definition is clearly at odds with the context of the Idaho 
Legislature's use of "practicable," especially within Title 49 of the Idaho Code. Mr. Neal has 
explained that the Idaho Legislature has used, within Title 49, the term "practicable" in a 
manner inconsistent with the state's proposed definition. Memorandum in Support of 
Petition for Review, pp. 10-12 (discussing the legislature's use of"practicable" within LC.§ 
49-717(1)). 
Idaho Code§§ 49-717(1) and 49-63 7(1) contain virtually identical language and 
therefore should be read together pursuant to Knott and LC.§ 73-113. The state asserts 
that it has fully responded to this argument Respondent's Br. on Review, p. 12 (''Neal's 
arguments on review are essentially a truncated version of the arguments he advanced in 
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his fi.rrell:mt's brief submitted to the Court of Appeals. [T]he state t½oroughly responded 
to those arguments"). However, the state has never once-before the Court of Appeals or 
anywhere else-attempted to reconcile its proposed dictionary definition with the 
legislature's use of "practicable" within Title 49. 
The further-truncated version of the argument is this: LC. § 49-717 (1 ), a very 
similar statute within Title 49, requires bicycles to be ridden "as close as practicable to the 
right-hand curb or edge of the roadway except ... to avoid conditions including fixed or 
moving objects, parked or moving vehicles, bicycles, pedestrians, animals, surface hazards 
or substandard width lanes that make it unsafe to continue along the right-hand curb or 
edge" (emphasis added). The state believes "as nearly/close as practicable" provides an 
exception to the general requirement only in cases in which "there are objective 
circumstances that would make it impracticable" to adhere to the general requirement of 
maintaining a lane. Respondent's Br. on Review, p. 12. 
But if that is the exception, then what is "except to avoid conditions ... that make it 
unsafe to continue"? Would those "unsafe conditions" not be "objective circumstances that 
would make adherence impracticable"? In the state's analysis, it has consistently neglected 
to address this clear expression of the legislature's intended use of "practicable:' 
Mr. Neal interprets the statute to allow for minor incidental lane breaches. This 
interpretation of "as nearly as practicable" makes perfect sense of the legislature's Title 49 
usage. The state's definition would render superfluous/redundant the language, "except to 
avoid conditions ... that make it unsafe to continue .... " State v. Schulz, 151 Idaho 863, 866 
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(2011) ("the Court must give effect to all the word~ and provisions of the statute so that 
none will be void, superfluous, or redundant.") 
The state's definition therefore should be rejected. Because Mr. Neal's lane 
breach-if there was a lane breach at all-was exceedingly minor, it therefore fell within 
the "as nearly as practicable" language that suspends the single lane rule. Consequently, 
law enforcement lacked a reasonable suspicion that a traffic infraction had occurred and 
the resulting evidence should be suppressed. The district court therefore erred when it 
held otherwise. I ts decision should be reversed. 
D. The State has not Established that the Trial Court was "Clearly Erroneous" when it it 
Found that the State Failed to Prove that the Relevant Conduct Occurred in Boise 
Before the Court of Appeals, the state argued that Magistrate Swain was entitled to 
"no deference" in his factual finding that the state failed to prove that Mr. Neal's driving 
occurred in Boise. Respondent Court of Appeals Br., p. 18. In his reply brief, Mr. Neal 
responded with his opinion of the state's conclusion. Appellant Court of Appeals Br., pp. 
7-10. Although the state received the opportunity to refute Mr. Neal's reply brief 
arguments, the state has chosen not to do so. The facts supported Magistrate Swain's 
conclusion, and the state has virtually abandoned its arguments to the contrary. Because 
the state did not prove that the conduct occurred in Boise, the state cannot rely on the 
Boise City Code. 
E. Mistake of Law 
-- ·1; This Court Should Not Consider the Mistake of Law Argument 
For the reasons argued before the Idaho Court of Appeals, this Court should not 
consider the "mistake of law" argument offered by the district court. Appellant Opening 
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Br., pp. 22-24; see also, State v. MorJan, '!: Idaho 109, 112 (2013) ("This Court denied the 
motion to augment the record on due process grounds, holding that Morgan had not had a 
fair opportunity to present evidence with regard to Boise City Ordinance 10-11-04. As the 
ordinance is not properly before this Court for consideration, we will not consider this 
justification for the stop") (emphasis added) and State v. McCarthy, 133 Idaho 119, 125 (Ct. 
App. 1999) ("Because this is a theory that was not advanced by the prosecutor at the 
suppression hearing, McCarthy had no opportunity to respond through evidence and the 
magistrate did not address it in his findings. Consequently, we will not consider it") 
(emphasis added). 
The U.S. Supreme Court also has refused to hear arguments that the state failed to 
raise below. United States v.jones, 132 S.Ct. 945,954 (2012) ("The Government argues ... 
that [the] search ... was reasonable-and thus lawful-under the Fourth Amendment 
because 'officers had reasonable suspicion ... to believe that Jones was a leader in a 
large-scale cocaine distribution conspiracy.' We have no occasion to consider this 
argument. The Government did not raise it below, and [w]e consider the argument 
forfeited.") ( emphasis added) ( alterations, citation omitted). 
2. If this Court Considers the Mistake of Law Issue as it Relates to the Federal 
Constitution, it should Hold that the Mistake of Law was Unreasonable 
In Heien v. North Carolina, the U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged that a traffic stop is 
a seizure under the Fourth Amendment, and therefore it requires "a particularized and 
objective basis for suspecting the particular person stoppedv·of-breaking the law. _ S.Ct. at 
_. In Heien, the question was "whether reasonable suspicion can rest on a mistaken 
understanding of the scope of a legal prohibition." Id. The U.S. Supreme Court held "that it 
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can.}} Id. On this new rule, the Heien Court stated that "[t]he limit is that the mistakes m~.1st 
be those ofreasonable men." Id. (quotation omitted). The Court further noted thatthe 
"Fourth Amendment tolerates only reasonable mistakes, and those mistakes-whether of 
fact or of law-must be objectively reasonable." Id. ( emphasis supplied). 
In Heien, the defendant was stopped for driving a vehicle with only one working 
brake light. The North Carolina courts concluded that only one brake light was required, 
because the relevant statute referenced "a stop lamp" and "[t]he stop lampY Id. The 
mistake was reasonable, according to the U.S. Supreme Court, because the statute also 
referenced incorporation of a stop lamp unit into "one or more other rear lamps." Id. 
(emphasis supplied). "Other" suggests more than one stop lamp. 
In contrast, this case does not involve such an understandable mistake oflaw. 
Unlike in Heien, this case does not involve an ambiguous statute. In Heien, the Solicitor 
General conceded that it would be "exceedingly rare" for an officer to make a "reasonable 
mistake of law" involving an unambiguous statute. Id. (Kagen, J., concurring). As this Court 
recognized in Verska, an interpretation of a statute must be reasonable in order to create an 
ambiguity. 151 Idaho at 896 ("An unambiguous statute would have only one reasonable 
interpretation. An alternative interpretation that is unreasonable would not make it 
ambiguous.}}) If the statute is unambiguous, then a mistake of law as to that statute would 
be, by definition, unreasonable. 
The issue therefore apparently boils down to whether the statute is ambiguous. By 
the time this Court reaches the mistake of law issue, it will have determined whether the 
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statute was ambiguous. The argumentssupp'Jrting or opposing that position are contained 
above. 
3. Even if the Mistake of Law Argument Should be Considered, and Even if the Court 
Holds that the Mistake was Reasonable, this Court may Wish to Remand the Case for 
Consideration of the Idaho Constitution 
Mr. Neal brought his motion to suppress pursuant to the Idaho and U.S. 
Constitutions. R. 32-33. It is true that this Court usually will recognize our constitution's 
"greater protection to Idaho citizens" only in cases in which the proponent of greater 
protection proffers arguments related to "the uniqueness of our state, our Constitution, and 
our longstanding jurisprudence." State v. Donato, 135 Idaho 469 (2001). One "of these 
factors [must] support a divergence from the interpretation of the Fourth Amendment by 
the United States Supreme Court" Id. (emphasis added). This Court has rejected Idaho 
Constitutional arguments because "there is no apparent reason for us to depart from the 
federal understanding of the rights at issue." State v.Johnson, 152 Idaho 41, 47 (2011) 
(citing Donato factors). 
The key difficulty in this case is that, until very recently, there was no interpretation 
by the U.S. Supreme Court, and the general "federal understanding" was that an officer's 
seizure could not be justified by a "reasonable mistake of law." See, State v. Heien, 737 
S.E.2d 351, 360 (2012) (abrogated by State v. Heien, _ S.Ct. _) (Hudson, J., dissenting) ("the 
Eighth Circuit stands alone among the federal circuits on this issue. The First, Third, Fifth, 
Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits all apply some form of the rule that an 
officer's mistake oflaw cannot be the basis for reasonable suspicion") ( emphasis added). 
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Mr. Neal could .not argue t:h2t Idaho's constitution should "diverge" from a U5. 
Supreme Court interpretation that did not exist. But now, that interpretation exists. After 
Mr. Neal filed his petition for review, but before the state filed its most recent brief, the U.S. 
Supreme Court addressed the "mistake of law" issue. Heien v. North Carolina,_ S.Ct. _.5 
The Idaho Constitutional issue was preserved below, but this Court has not received the 
benefit of briefing on appeal, or of lower courts' opinions on the issue. Justice Horton has 
acknowledged this problem when he declined to concur with a persuasive concurrence by 
Justice Eismann, because the issue was unbriefed at that point. State v. Barton, 154 Idaho 
289 (2013) (" Although the views expressed in Justice Eismann' s concurring opinion 
warrant serious consideration, I am unable to join him at this time because we do not have 
the benefit of briefing from the parties to this appeal"). 
A similar problem exists here. Mr. Neal has not waived the issue, but because of the 
recently altered jurisprudential landscape, the issue is not briefed either. If this Court 
believes the mistake oflaw issue should be reached in this case, it may desire that the issue 
be considered by Idaho's lower courts before this Court addresses it. Therefore, this Court 
may wish to remand the case to the district court for remand to the magistrate in order to 
consider the issue. As discussed below, however, Mr. Neal also invites the Court to address 
the Idaho Constitutional issue. 
5 Surprisingly, the state chose not to discuss this recent landmark case in its brief. 
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4. If this Court Considers the Idaho Constitutional Argument, this Court Should Hold, 
Consistently with its Precedent, that the Idaho Constitution does not Countenance 
Mistakes of Law as Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement 
In State v. Koivu, this Court issued a thorough analysis of our constitution's search 
and seizure jurisprudence, and a comprehensive recitation of its relevant history. 152 
Idaho 511 (2012). In Koivu, the state asked this Courtto overrule State v. Guzman, 122 
Idaho 981 (1992). Guzman rejected the state's invitation to apply the "good faith" 
exception to the exclusionary rule. In analyzing the issue in Koivu, this Court began by 
providing a synopsis of the progression of the exclusionary rule within the Federal 
Constitution. Importantly, this Court explained thatthe U.S. Supreme Court's "view of the 
exclusionary rule ... changed [i]n Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 96 S.Ct. 3037, 49 L.Ed.2d 
1067 (1976), [where] the Court held that the exclusionary rule 'is not a personal 
constitutional right,' nor is it 'calculated to redress the injury to the privacy of the victim of 
the search or seizure."' Koivu, 152 Idaho at 514. 
Next, this Court explained United States v. Leon, the case that this Court declined to 
follow in Guzman. "In Leon, the police had seized evidence acting in reasonable reliance on 
a search warrant, but the warrant was later determined to have been issued without 
probable cause." Id. at 514-15. As a result, the U.S. Supreme Court ''.held that the 
exclusionary rule would not apply to evidence obtained in objectively reasonable reliance 
on a subsequently invalidated search warrant" because "the exclusionary rule is designed 
to deter police misconduct rather than to punish the errors of judges and magistrates." Id. 
(quotations omitted). The good-faith exception, this Court explained, was expanded to 
include reasonable reliance on subsequently invalidated statutes, an arrest pursuant to a 
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"warrant" that the officer had no reason to know was quashed; s-?arches pursuant to 
precedents that were later overruled. Id. The reason in all of those cases was the same: 
exclusion would not advance the interest in deterring police misconduct. 
As this Court explained, however, that rationale is not as significant when 
interpreting Idaho's constitution. "In its decision[ in State v. Arregui, 44 Idaho 43 (1927),) 
the [Idaho Supreme] Court made it clear that the evidence unlawfully obtained should be 
excluded simply because it was obtained in violation of the defendant's constitutional 
rights." Id. at 516 (emphasis added). As the Arregui Court stated, 
A continued rlisregard of the rights guaranteed under the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments, and the principles thereof incorporated in state Constitutions, 
heads us directly to revolution against their usurpation, if history tells us 
correctly that violation of the rights sought to be protected thereby was one 
of the chief moving reasons for the Revolution. If, one by one, the rights 
guaranteed by the federal Constitution, can and must, for expediency's sake, 
be violated, abolished, stricken from that immortal document, and from state 
Constitutions, we will find ourselves governed by expediency, not laws or 
Constitutions, and the revolution will have come. 
I can see no such expediency or necessity for the enforcement of any law as 
to justify violation of constitutional rights to accomplish it. The shock to the 
sensibilities of the average citizen when his government violates a 
constitutional right of another is far more evil in its effect than the escape of 
any criminal through the courts' observance of those rights. 44 Idaho at 58 
(emphasis added). 
This principle was reiterated over a decade later, when this Court noted that the 
"rule is well settled in this state that evidence, procured in violation of defendant's 
constitutional immunity from search and seizure, is inadmissible and will be excluded if 
request for its suppression be timely made." State v. Conner, 59 Idaho 695, 703, 89 P.2d 
197,201 (1939). The principle was again reiterated in 1978: "The efforts of the courts and 
their officials to bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be 
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aided by the sacrifice ofthose great principles established by years of endeavor and ,.. , 
suffering which have resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law of the land." 
State v. Rauch, 99 Idaho 586. Rauch and Arregui "held that there were reasons supporting 
the exclusionary rule other than deterring unconstitutional searches and seizures that the 
law enforcement officers did not reasonably believe were lawful." Koivu, 15 2 Idaho at 518 
(emphasis added); see also, id. at 519 ("Idaho ha[s] clearly developed an exclusionary rule 
as a constitutionally mandated remedy for illegal searches and seizures in addition to other 
purposes behind the rule such as recognizing the exclusionary rule as a deterrent for police 
misconduct") (emphasis added, quotations omitted). 
The sole basis for the new Federal "reasonable mistake of law" rule is that it is 
consistent with the principle that "the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is 
reasonableness." Heien, _ S.Ct. at_ ( quotations omitted). The Court added that "To be 
reasonable is not to be perfect, and so the Fourth Amendment allows for some mistakes on 
the part of government officials, giving them fair leeway for enforcing the law in the 
community's protection." Id. ( emphasis added). 
These Federal notions are precisely what the Idaho Constitution rejects. If an officer 
reasonably relies on an invalid warrant, that reasonable reliance does not negate the 
invalidity of the warrant. Idaho's constitution is concerned with violations of the 
constitution, and does not concern itself with "good excuses" for violating it. Again, the 
violation of the constitution "is far more evil in its effect than the escape of any criminal." 
Arregui, supra. Here, if the traffic stop was effected as a result of a law enforcement 
officer's mistake of law, the invalid stop was not rendered valid by the fact that his mistake 
25 
. was reasonable. Therefore, under the Idaho Constitution, Mr. Neal \•vasillegally seized and 
all resulting evidence is inadmissible. 
V. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse the district court and remand 
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